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ABSTRACT 
Disaster recovery and incident response has become a necessity in today’s technologically-driven 
business world. A significant amount of consumer information is put into businesses’ information 
systems with the expectation to protect their private and financial data. This discussion addresses 
the importance of why organizations need effective disaster recovery and contingency planning. 
A foundation of knowledge is built through the understanding of the statistical and practical 
implications of disaster recovery and contingency planning. The practical implications will be 
understood through two separate case studies. Each case study is unique in that one addresses 
disaster recovery when facing a natural disaster, while the other is a cyber-attack of man-made 
origin. This discussion will allow conclusions to be drawn on why there is a need to plan for natural 
disasters and cyber-attacks separately. This will be accomplished through analyzing the case 
studies and their statistical properties. 
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Ever since the tragedy of September 
11th, an important question has emerged for 
organizations within the business world. 
What do you do when your business suffers a 
blow that halts day-to-day operations? This 
very question shifted focus onto the practice 
of disaster recovery (DR) and contingency 
planning. In today’s technologically-driven 
world, how a DR plan and contingency plan 
(CP) is implemented is critical in the 
operations of medium-to-large sized 
organizations. The field of DR and CP is the 
solution for what actions to take if the 
unthinkable happens to an organization. 
Effective implementation of DR and CP will 
save an organization from the loss of 
customers, a damaged reputation, or 
bankruptcy.  
 
To understand the criticality for 
implementation of DR and CP, a comparison 
of two separate categories of incidents will be 
explored to gain a foundation upon which to 
build. We will explore DR and CP for both 
natural disasters and cyber-attacks through 
key areas within these incidents. This 
comparison will be made on how DR and CP 
are created and implemented and the 
associated statistical insights for these 
incidents. Understanding these differences is 
crucial in perceiving how these two incidents 
can affect a business and what must happen 
for an organization to recover if either 
incident were to occur. 
  
Once the foundation of understanding 
is established for the importance and need for 
DR and CP, we will examine practical real-
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world examples of two separate 
organizations who failed to recover 
effectively from an incident. This will be 
accomplished through a case study where we 
will identify the organization, incident type, 
what happened as the incident unfolded, and 
how they failed to respond to the incident. In 
conclusion, a solution will be drawn in how 
these organizations could have altered their 
DR and CP and prevent the failures of the 
organizations’ ability to respond in an 
effective capacity. 
 
The core function of a DR plan is to 
maintain functionality of business processes 
when and not if an incident of a disastrous 
proportion is to occur (Martin, 2002). For a 
DR plan to be effective, organizations must 
plan for disasters of all types. Disasters can 
take the shape of cyber-attacks, natural 
disasters, or technical/hardware disasters. 
Organizations need to plan for technical and 
hardware disasters; however, because these 
incidents are unique to the organization, they 
will be beyond the purview of this discussion. 
This examination will cover cyber-attacks 
and natural disasters in hopes of answering 
why it is a necessity to plan for such incidents 
separately. 
 
Technology has become a vital 
function for organizations that exist today. 
When a disaster strikes, whether it be of man-
made origin or from mother nature, 
technology disruptions can occur. When 
these disruptions happen, business operations 
can come to a halt and can cause heavy 
financial impact on the organization. Over 
95% of large corporations report that one 
hour of a continuous technology disruption 
can result in costs that exceed $100,000 in a 
given year (Roguine, 2016). The financial 
numbers continue to grow at a staggering 
rate, with data center downtimes averaging a 
financial loss of $690,204 per incident. These 
unforeseen incidents occur at least once for 
more than 90% of data centers within a two-
year period (Roguine, 2016).   
 
These general disruptions become 
quite sinister when the rate of occurrence for 
these disruptions and the associated 
consequences become apparent. According 
to iCorps Technologies (2015), one in five 
businesses report a technology disruption 
every year. Additionally, 4 out of 5 of these 
businesses that experience these disruptions 
go out of business in less than a year and half. 
The statistics are profound in the amount of 
financial burden that is accrued from these 
disruptions, especially with 54% of 
companies experiencing an incident that was 
not resolved within an eight-hour period in 
the past five years. In an ideal environment, a 
business should be recovering from a 
disruption in the least amount of time as 
possible to avoid substantial damages; 
however, 98% of businesses are not capable 
of recovering from their last disruption 
within an hour (Guest Blogger, 2018). These 
are only the general figures associated with 
any type of disruption that results in 
downtime. To understand from where these 
figures originate, we must turn our attention 
to what role natural disasters and cyber-
attacks play in these figures and disruptions.  
 
To recognize how organizations 
create DR plans for natural disasters, we must 
clarify the definition of natural disasters and 
outline a few examples of these events. 
Natural disasters can be defined as “extreme, 
sudden events caused by environmental 
factors” that result in catastrophic damage or 
the loss of life in the affected area (Fact 
Monster, 2017, para. 1). There are several 
different types of natural disasters that are 
unique to a geographic area; these disasters 
can include hurricanes, earthquakes, 
wildfires, volcanos, tsunamis, and tornadoes. 
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There is some preliminary work in 
developing a DR plan for natural disasters 
that must be evaluated and reviewed. This 
preliminary work can be listed in six steps: 
“establish a planning team, set goals, analyze 
capabilities and hazards, develop action 
plans, create written documentation, and 
ensure everyone is familiar with the plan” 
(Post, 2018, What factors should be 
considered section, para. 2). 
 
Once a DR planning team has been 
established, the organization can begin to set 
goals for what they want their DR plan to 
accomplish. The most common goal for a DR 
plan can be described as how an organization 
can restore operations to its information 
systems and application while maintaining 
the integrity and availability of data (Post, 
2018).  
 
Organizations can begin to draft their 
DR plan for natural disasters by planning for 
the worst-case scenario. A business owner 
who was affected by Hurricane Harvey in 
Houston, Texas stated, “many did not take 
the worst-case scenario seriously until it 
became reality” (Jefferson, 2017, para. 4). 
The identification of worst-case scenarios for 
businesses occurs by conducting an external 
analysis that predicts likely natural threats the 
organization may encounter (Jefferson, 
2017). It is imperative that this external 
analysis is thorough in its processes to ensure 
an organization can identify worst-case 
scenarios that are likely for the geographic 
area. After potential risk of natural disasters 
are assessed, there must be a plan with 
sequential steps put into place to handle a 
scenario where the worst-case becomes 
reality.  
 
Developing an action plan that 
responds to a natural disaster is the most 
crucial component in the DR plan for natural 
disasters. To do this effectively, certain 
questions need to be resolved. These 
questions often include: How can we ensure 
the safety of employees? Is my data 
effectively backed up to a safe location? How 
should communication be maintained with 
employees? Does the organization need to 
relocate its operations to a temporary 
location? Can my employees be equipped to 
work remotely? When these questions are 
addressed with robust answers, an 
organization can begin to detail the specifics 
of their action plan to ensure their 
organization’s ability to operate during a 
natural disaster.  
 
Lastly, the organization needs to 
create written documentation, including 
backup protocols, plans, appointed 
responsibilities, and procedures. Once the 
plan is thoroughly documented from start to 
finish, the organization will need to facilitate 
training sessions to educate all personnel 
(Post, 2018). These plans must be integrated 
into ongoing company operations and 
employee training.  
 
With a firm grasp on what is required 
for DR planning for natural disasters, we can 
now examine the differences between 
planning for natural disasters versus cyber-
attacks. The idea is the same for both types of 
incidents; the goal for the DR plan is to 
resume normal business operations in the 
least amount of time to mitigate the damage 
and loss for when an incident occurs. 
Although the two have some overlap and the 
result is the same when not effectively 
responded to, a significant difference in 
planning for a cyber security breach versus a 
natural disaster is that recovery operations for 
security breaches are dynamic and planned 
from a high-level perspective. Cyber 
breaches can take shape in numerous ways 
requiring the organizations to adapt to the 
threat event (Todev, 2018). This difference 
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requires organizations to be more vigilant 
and adaptable for cyber security breaches.  
 
Another differentiating factor is that 
natural disasters only manifest as an external 
threat. Cyber breaches can occur both 
internally and externally; therefore, an 
organization must be prepared for either 
scenario. Threats from within the 
organization can cause an equal amount of 
damage as external breaches, making it 
imperative that organizations protect 
themselves from the very people they 
employ. Internal threats represent 80% of 
security incidents (Feldman, n.d.). The 
largest problem that cyber breaches present is 
that, unlike recovery from natural disasters 
where organizations can simply restore the 
systems, this approach will not be effective 
because the data is now corrupted. 
Organizations plan for data loss when 
mitigating infections corrupt data. The 
remediation of corrupted data requires data to 
be restored prior to the date of infection 
(Fearn, 2018). If an organization were to 
restore the infected systems from a corrupted 
back-up, the perfect bridge would be 
provided for the infectious malware to 
traverse into the restored or new system.  
 
With some of the differences 
highlighted between the two types of 
incidents, we can explore DR planning for 
cyber-attacks. As the steps and processes are 
made evident, we can begin to correlate the 
similarities between DR planning for natural 
disasters and cyber-attacks. DR planning for 
cyber-attacks has a similar architecture as 
recovery plans from natural disasters. A 
planning team must be formed that is well-
versed in cyber threats, with clear 
expectations set forth by the organization of 
what is expected of the team in the event of 
an incident.  
 
The action plan begins with the 
implementation of layered security controls 
and continuous monitoring tools to trap 
infectious threats before the entire network 
becomes compromised (Todev, 2018). 
Following the hardening of organizational 
resources, there should be scanning and 
detection software that can alert the response 
team when an incident occurs. The length of 
time a breach goes undetected directly 
correlates with the financial losses an 
organization will sustain. Over 25% of 
security breaches are undetected for at least a 
30-day period, and 10% of these threats 
remain undetected for a minimum of one year 
(Collins, 2017). 
 
The goal of most organizations is to 
completely avoid a cyber breach, but this 
becomes a flawed approach when faced with 
a cyber-attack that cannot be stopped before 
it has run its course. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology states, “over-
reliance on prevention is just as bad as not 
being prepared.” Instead, organizations 
should be equipped for any cyber threat, 
corrective actions, and recovery operations 
(as cited in Todev, 2018, Cybersecurity 
Recovery Objectives section, para. 3).  
 
After planning for the recovery phase, 
organizations need to begin an ongoing 
process of seeking constant improvement 
with the hardening of their systems, the 
ability to detect vulnerabilities and their 
resolution, and the speed with which they can 
respond to various types of incidents. 
Organizations cannot overlook their 
documented DR plans and must continually 
educate themselves on the current threat 
landscape and adjust their DR plans 
accordingly. (Todev, 2018).  
 
The last part of the planning process 
for cyber-attacks is to continuously assess 
vulnerabilities within the perimeter and to 
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harden the system against future occurrences. 
DR teams need to analyze and document 
useful and accurate data to define a base line 
(Todev, 2018). It is critical that organizations 
document standard operating procedures, 
designated roles, and changes within their 
planned processes to allow the organization 
the ability to improve upon their response and 
recovery times (Todev, 2018).  
 
Thus far, we have established the core 
understanding on the need for DR and CP and 
analyzed the processes of DR for cyber 
breaches and natural disasters. Now we can 
turn our attention to the importance of proper 
implementation of DR. This will be realized 
through the examination of real-world case 
examples. The study of businesses who faced 
a disaster is a powerful tool that provides 
learning opportunities for security 
professionals to identify obscure 
vulnerabilities within their own organization. 
Within these case studies, the incident that 
occurred and its ramifications will be 
detailed. More importantly, how the 
company responded to the incident with their 
DR plan, or the lack thereof, will be reviewed 
and critiqued.  
 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina devastated Louisiana with damages 
exceeding $90 billion from the combination 
of Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans 
flood (Bradley, 2015). This storm left 
Louisiana businesses in disrepair, effectively 
rendering their day-to-day operations 
inoperable. Two years after the incident 
occurred, over 7,900 businesses in Louisiana 
went out of business (Bradley, 2015). This 
scenario begs the question, how can a 
business recover in the wake of such a 
disaster? 
 
Among the many businesses that 
were impacted by Hurricane Katrina, 
LifeShare Blood Centers can be identified as 
an organization that was irreparable when 
faced with a disaster of such magnitude. The 
nonprofit organization is based out of 
Shreveport, Louisiana and provides blood for 
3.7 million residents. The organization has 
provided blood for hospitals and other 
facilities for over 70 years, and studies have 
shown that 33% of patients’ lives depend on 
blood being readily available (Jones, 2016). 
The need for DR became abruptly apparent 
for Ric Jones, CIO of LifeShare Blood 
Centers: “When Hurricane Katrina’s 
devastation struck New Orleans, several of 
our regional centers were closed, demand for 
blood product substantially increased and 
donors were not able to give blood due to our 
site closures, interrupting the flow of 
business” (Bradley, 2015, para. 7). In 
addition, the company lacked alternative data 
back-ups of their extensive blood database. 
 
When companies fail to respond to or 
prepare for a natural disaster, there are often 
repercussions beyond the inability to 
generate revenue. In this instance, LifeShare 
Blood Centers found themselves unable to 
provide the vital service of providing blood 
for those in need. 
 
This dire situation occurred due to the 
complete lack of a DR and CP on the 
organization’s behalf. An effective and well 
thought out plan was not in place prior to this 
landmark storm and caught the company 
unprepared. This lack of planning could have 
led to the supply of blood running out and in 
effect cost lives. Ric Jones stated, “We did 
not have a disaster recovery plan in place 
when Katrina struck our office in Shreveport 
Louisiana and several other regional centers 
10 years ago. The storm closed several 
locations, and as a result, kept blood donors 
from being able to give blood at a time of 
substantial demand increase. The levels of 
critical blood types dropped to dangerously 
low levels” (Jones, 2016, para. 10). 
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 LifeShare Blood Centers managed to 
eventually recover from this disaster. 
However, it remains clear that their response 
to Hurricane Katrina should have been 
immensely dissimilar to what transpired after 
the storm struck. Numerous actions and 
controls should have ensued well in advance 
of the hurricane arriving ashore. What 
LifeShare Blood Centers lacked was a 
prepared response and plan that ensured the 
continuation of processes that would allow 
for the blood supply to be ready and available 
for those in need (Bradley, 2015). The lack of 
a detailed plan left LifeShare Blood Centers 
in a position to react rather than to respond to 
the incident. When an organization is 
reacting to an incident in an ill-prepared 
manner, they have already failed in their 
ability to respond to a disaster.  
 
The organization would have 
experienced a different outcome if they were 
able to commence the necessary processes 
the moment the storm was projected to hit 
their base of operations. These processes 
would begin with threat identification and 
risk assessment of the associated risk. An 
effective risk assessment provides an 
organization with information on where to 
allocate their attention and resources to 
mitigate the greatest risk. LifeShare Blood 
Centers should have identified the threat, 
profiled the potential threat events, taken 
inventory of assets, and factored in the 
potential for loss of life and resources using 
the threat events perceived impact on 
operations as a baseline (FEMA, 2018). 
Armed with this information, they would 
have been capable of forming a business 
continuity plan (BCP) that allowed business 
operations to continue.  
 
 After conducting a risk assessment, 
the company should launch the newly formed 
CP. This CP would involve several moving 
parts. The organization needed to already 
have multiple data storage locations to 
preserve their blood supply database. This 
would effectively place redundancy on 
information that is pertinent to business 
operations. Most importantly, they would 
need to protect their physical blood supply 
and its availability. To ensure the availability 
of blood, the company would contract an 
independent blood supplier as a redundant 
failsafe (Bradley, 2015). The preservation of 
the blood supply within the affected area of 
the hurricane would need to be moved to off-
site locations out of harm’s way. With the 
blood supply now safe, coordinated efforts 
will need to follow to accomplish LifeShare 
Blood Center’s priority of ensuring an 
accessible blood supply for those in need 
(Jones, 2016). 
 
Thus far, the BCP allows for the 
company to continue to operate outside the 
impacted area. This was made possible by 
moving their supply of blood to alternate 
locations and hiring a third-party vendor to 
support them during a state of emergency. 
However, once the hurricane lands, the state 
of travel and infrastructure would be 
unknown, making it problematic to make the 
blood supply available to those in need who 
are in the affected area.  
 
Cooperation at the local, state, and 
government levels will be necessary to 
continue to provide blood in the impacted 
regions. The combined efforts of these 
entities and government agencies will 
provide for the formation of a feasible plan 
that will get blood to those in need while 
keeping the company’s employee’s safe. 
Temporary storage for the blood would be 
strategically placed where it can be made 
available to those without infrastructure. 
State and government agencies will need to 
be contacted to find the best solution for 
transporting blood into the more devastated 
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areas where the need for blood is vital. 
Equipped with the necessary DR and CP, 
LifeShare Blood Centers would have been 
able to maintain operations and the priority of 
safeguarding the availability and integrity of 
its blood supply (Jones, 2016).  
 
Unfortunately, the BCP does not end 
at this point in the timeline. A worst-case 
disaster scenario of this magnitude would call 
for a long-term plan to return to normalcy. 
The extent of the damage inflicted by Katrina 
would call for the CP to be on-going for years 
to come. In this case example, the company 
would need to establish a new base of 
operations until the Louisiana infrastructure 
could be restored. Effective communication 
between management and the employees 
would have to occur to resume large scale 
operations. The organization’s CP will detail 
methods of communication throughout the 
company during this time, as well as when 
and where non-essential disaster personnel 
can resume work. These details would have 
been documented and planned for prior to the 
incident occurring.  
 
If the necessary steps were to have 
been taken, a predictively different outcome 
might have transpired. This organization’s 
experience has still proven to be valuable. 
The CIO, Ric Jones, has come to a new 
understanding of the importance of DR and 
CP. It is no longer a component of their 
organization that is not considered. LifeShare 
Blood Centers now has extensive resources 
invested into DR and CP. Since Katrina, 
according to Ric Jones LifeShare has shifted 
to “a cloud-based data-recovery system that 
ensures data is backed up continually and 
protected and that the system is tested 
annually. Specifically, LifeShare is 
supported with secure cloud-based recovery 
by 12 servers and numerous critical 
applications that handle its vital blood data – 
donors, inventory, blood drives – as well as 
its financial and payroll systems” (Jones, 
2016, para. 15). Jones enhanced these 
controls even further through mirroring the 
Shreveport data systems in a secondary data 
center that is located in another geographic 
area in the United States. This would ensure 
a natural disaster would not impact both data 
centers in a single event. IT personnel are 
now able to monitor data and statistics in real 
time across their 12 servers.  
 
The tragedy and hardship Hurricane 
Katrina brought on to the citizens and 
businesses of Louisiana is indescribable. 
However, this storm taught businesses the 
value of DR and CP. Many believe the 
unthinkable will not occur, until it does, 
leaving the organization unprepared. 
LifeShare Blood Centers was able to recover 
in time, but often many do not recover when 
they fail to effectively respond to a natural 
disaster. The valuable lesson to take away 
from this case study is to develop and be 
capable of implementing a plan prior to a 
threat occurring (Bradley, 2015).  
 
The examination of DR and CP and 
their role in responding to a natural disaster 
has been made apparent. We learned the 
importance in being prepared for such 
incidents. Now, we can begin to shift our 
focus to DR for cyber breaches. These two 
areas of incidence have overlap, but 
businesses must realize the differences in the 
incidents. The study of a real-world case 
example of how a business responded, or 
improperly responded, to a cyber breach will 
allow us to draw a conclusion on what these 
similarities and differences are.  
 
On September 8th, 2014, Home Depot 
(HD) was forced to announce a data breach 
that is classified as the largest compromise of 
payment information in the United States 
(Seals, 2017). This data breach cost HD 
$27.25 million U.S. dollars in settlement 
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fees. The breach that led to this massive 
payout was the theft of HD’s customers’ 
credit and debit card information. To 
understand why the attackers targeted HD’s 
point-of-sale (POS) system, we first must 
understand how attackers use the stolen 
information. 
 
The goal of hackers who target 
payment information is to profit at the 
expense of others. There are several ways that 
attackers use this stolen information to 
generate cash for themselves. The most 
common uses for a stolen card are large 
online purchases, cash withdraws, or illegal 
sales to other cyber criminals (Michael, 
2017). Typically, the more sophisticated 
attackers will sell the card information over 
the dark web to other cybercriminals. Paul 
Michael explains how pricing for these stolen 
cards varies, “depending on how much 
information is provided. If it is simply the 
card number and expiration date, it will not 
bring much money. These cards are sold for 
a few bucks, because the chances of 
successfully making off with a chunk of 
money is slim. If the security number on the 
back is added, the price goes up. If the PIN is 
known, the asking price is higher” (2017, 
para. 8). If the seller provides more detailed 
information, such as purchasing behaviors 
and the answers to security questions, then 
the seller can fetch a premium price for the 
card.  
 
With an understanding of why 
cybercriminals target payment card 
information, we can explore how the 
attackers were able to breach HD. Mitch 
MoosBrugger (personal communication, 
September 2018), the South East Regional 
Director of CyberArk, has stated that 85-95% 
of data breaches occur from the compromise 
of privileged credentials. Unfortunately for 
HD, this was how the attackers were able to 
gain access using a third-party vendor’s login 
credentials. After securing the logon 
credentials to HD’s vendor environment, the 
exploit of a Windows zero-day weakness 
provided access to the HD intranet through a 
hired third party’s environment (Hawkins, 
2015).  
 
Once the cybercriminals penetrated 
HD’s network, they had enough privileges to 
install memory scraping malware on over 
7,500 self-checkout POS terminals (Smith, 
2014). The installed malware stole 56 million 
credit and debit cards. In addition to the 
stolen card data, the hackers captured over 53 
million e-mail addresses. The cybercriminals 
sold the card information on the dark web and 
used the stolen e-mail addresses to launch a 
massive phishing campaign, effectively 
capitalizing their efforts.  
 
Home Depot could have avoided this 
breach in several ways. Preventing, 
detecting, and containing a cyber breach is a 
multi-layer process. This process is case-by-
case due to the dynamic nature of cyber 
breaches. We will examine from the outside 
what HD missed in the hardening of their 
systems that is specific to this breach. 
 
 Starting at the point of breach, the 
hardening of HD’s authentication factor 
would have prevented the attackers from 
gaining access through the third-party’s 
credentials. The deployment of CyberArk’s 
password vault software would have stopped 
the hackers from ever penetrating the system. 
Using CyberArk’s product HD would have 
prevented the attackers from using valid 
authentication credentials, while ensuring 
that users are still capable of carrying out 
business operations (CyberArk, 2018). This 
authentication control works by updating and 
rotating secure credentials and Secure Shell 
keys at pre-determined points or as requested 
per organizational policies (CyberArk, 
2018). If HD had this authentication factor 
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implemented, the attackers would have been 
unsuccessful in their login attempts. The 
automatic rotation system for CyberArk’s 
password vault would have recycled the 
authorized credentials as soon as the third-
party vendor’s login was used the first time. 
This would have resulted in the 
cybercriminals being denied access after 
attempting to re-use credentials.  
 
Home Depot’s software and hardware 
configuration presented numerous 
vulnerabilities. The hardening of these 
configurations would have prevented the 
breach or allowed the intrusion to be detected 
almost instantaneously, allowing for a swift 
response. A glaring vulnerability presented 
itself at arguably the most important piece of 
software: the operating system (OS). HD’s 
POS devices were running Windows XP, a 
heavily outdated OS. Windows XP is known 
to be easily compromised, and it is shocking 
that HD was still allowing this OS to run on 
its POS machines (Hawkins, 2015). There are 
several newer OS’s that should have been in 
use that are compatible with security features, 
such as, “P2P (point-to-point) encryption, 
antivirus, and many other applications that 
are vital to locking down your POS systems” 
(Hawkins, 2015, p. 8).  
 
HD was using Symantec Endpoint 
Protection for anti-virus software but were 
lacking in some of their configuration 
settings. Brett Hawkins from the SANS 
Institute commented that HD did not utilize a 
vital feature known as Network Threat 
Protection (2015). This feature works as a 
host intrusion prevention system. Hawkins 
continues by claiming that, “Having 
configured POS devices with this feature 
activated at my own organization, I can attest 
to the success of this feature when doing 
vulnerability assessments on these systems” 
(Hawkins, 2015, p. 8). 
 
With HD’s systems running 
Windows XP and the lack of necessary 
hardware, they were not capable of 
supporting P2P encryption. This security 
feature would have allowed credit card 
information to be protected the moment it is 
collected and would encrypt the data as it is 
stored in memory (Hawkins, 2015). The 
attackers would have been able to still steal 
the payment data but would have been 
unsuccessful in reading the encrypted data 
once removed from HD’s environment.  
 
The security vulnerabilities do not 
stop at the software and hardware level. At 
the network level, HD did not have their 
networks segmented onto VLANs (Virtual 
Local Area Network). Network segmentation 
is defined as separating a larger network into 
smaller networks that isolates them. This 
practice allows a network to be more robust, 
since the isolation of the networks allows for 
a layered security approach that prevents 
breaches from rapidly spreading (Metivier, 
2017). Network segmentation hardens the 
system by preventing intruders from 
navigating around within the system. In the 
case of HD, once the intruders penetrated the 
network and gained access to the vendor 
environment, they would have been unable to 
jump to the POS network if it were on a 
segregated network.  
 
Vulnerabilities persisted at the 
organizational level; the lack of a 
vulnerability management system allowed 
the previously documented vulnerabilities to 
be exploited. Vulnerability management 
systems can be described as the process of 
“identifying, classifying, remediating and 
mitigating vulnerabilities. It is also described 
as the discovery, reporting, prioritization, and 
response to vulnerabilities in your network” 
(Hilaire, 2017, para. 3). The importance of 
this system is evident as it is required by 
respected risk management frameworks that 
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are widely accepted and practiced. The 
SANS Institute posits on their most recent 
framework that vulnerability assessment 
must “continuously acquire, assess, and take 
action on new information in order to identify 
vulnerabilities, and to remediate and 
minimize the window of opportunity for 
attackers” (Hilaire, 2017, para. 4). 
 
Lastly, HD took five months to detect 
that an intrusion had occurred. No matter 
how efficient an organization is at preventing 
intrusions, eventually a breach will occur. 
Therefore, detection is crucial in an 
organization’s security practices. HD lacked 
sufficient monitoring software, such as a 
security information and event management 
(SIEM) system that would detect and notify 
administrators of any activity within their 
POS system (Hawkins, 2018). Once 
deployed, SIEM software will scan the 
network and “gather security-related events 
from end-user devices, servers, network 
equipment, as well as specialized security 
equipment like firewalls, antivirus or 
intrusion prevention systems” (Rouse, 2018, 
para. 5). For five months, intruders were 
inside HD’s network collecting and stealing 
their customers’ data, resulting in large 
settlement fees of over $27 million U.S. 
dollars. If HD had a SIEM system, they 
would have been able to respond more 
quickly and mitigate any potential data theft 
that occurred.  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn 
from this case study is that there is no specific 
way to respond to a cyber breach. It requires 
a dynamic effort that is accomplished 
through the hardening of the entire system at 
the external, internal, network, hardware, and 
software levels. By taking a layered security 
approach that is effective in its practice, an 
incident will be prevented or detected, 
contained, and remediated. Businesses have a 
choice to learn from other organizations’ 
mistakes. It becomes a matter of 
responsibility for businesses to learn from the 
mistakes of others and to implement what 
they learn into the hardening of their own 
systems. The knowledge and experiences are 
readily available for proactive businesses to 
apply within their own environments.  
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